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Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature on global governance by highlighting the 
importance of not losing sight of the nation state as an important player in the 
transnational governance arena. Specifically, literature on global (accounting) 
regulation devotes a great deal of attention to the roles of organisations and agencies 
with transnational remit (such as global standard setters, donor agencies) while often 
downplaying the significant impacts of the more traditional cross-country links forged 
through economic relationships and resource dependencies between national and 
transnational institutional fields. This was specially noted in the case of the indirect 
influences of the US’s decision to delay IFRS convergence. While being interpreted as 
an indirect source of influence, such a decision played a very significant role on the 
convergence negotiations in India. The study shows how the US influence was 
channelled through Japan with which India has significant trade and economic relations 
and, most importantly, holds a joint forum specifically to discuss convergence issues. 
The consequences of India’s links with countries such as US and Japan in the decision-
making process provide a vivid indication of the important roles of cross-governmental 
relationships in the global governance arena, and also question the position of 
transnational organisations as pervasive powers in such governance. The study’s 
findings clearly demonstrate that the pursuit of full IFRS convergence strongly favoured 
by the transnational forces was invariably challenged in the Indian context by the 
influences of powerful nation states advocating a more cautious approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regardless of severe criticisms on its international applicability, IFRS has been adopted 
fully or partially by approximately 120 countries (Sharma, Joshi & Kansal, 2017). 
Countries such as Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand are yet to finalise their 
convergence decisions. Although India committed itself to achieve IFRS convergence 
by 2011, the convergence decision-making process has been marked by much public 
political debate with the consequence that despite two further deadlines being 
announced by the state, the process had suffered severe delay. The official stance of the 
state in favour of convergence had been contradicted in practice by repeated failures to 
translate this policy into action. This paper aims to explore the influence of India’s trade 
and economic alliances in delaying its convergence decision. The study uses concepts 
of transnational policy networks, resource dependencies and institutional theory to 
analyse this context.  
 
Analysing the convergence decisions of countries undertaking accounting reforms in 
the light of significant trade and economic alliances, especially with powerful countries 
such as the US and Japan, reveals additional dynamics of divergence between rationales 
and reasons cited by nation-states in making such decisions (Ramanna & Sletten, 2009). 
Such analysis adds to our understanding of the relationship between power, resource 
dependency and institutional forces that shape the accounting regulatory arena 
(Crawford, Ferguson, Helliar & Power, 2014; Bengtsson, 2011). The significance of 
trade and economic alliances in shaping convergence decisions have been previously 
explored in developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Nobes & 
Parker, 2010; Zeff & Nobes, 2010; Ramanna, 2012). However, studies exploring the 
influences of such alliances in shaping convergence decisions in developing countries 
are limited (Mir & Rahman, 2005). Since a large number of countries that have 
converged with IFRS are developing countries (IFRS, 2017), exploring the role of these 
influences on convergence decisions in these countries would add to our understanding 
of the on-going accounting convergence drive and the different outcomes of such 
convergence (Weaver & Woods ,2015; Ghio & Verona, 2015; Sharma, Joshi & Kansal, 
2017). 
 
India is one of the largest developing economies in the world; sixth largest in terms of 
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and third largest in terms of purchasing power 
parity (pubdocs.worldbank.org, 2017).  Recently the World Bank ranked India as the 
fastest growing economy in the world (World Bank, 2017). Having been classified as a 
major Newly Industrialised Country1 (NIC) by the IMF and reported to be a transition 
economy by the WB (World Bank, 2013), the Indian socio-political and economic 
context often displays characteristics of both developed and developing countries 
(Boddin, 2016). Hence the findings of this paper are relevant to not just developing 
countries but could also be applicable to some extent in the context of developed 
countries. The decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India commenced 
with the state setting a deadline of 2011 to achieve convergence. This deadline was not 
met and during the course of the next 5 years, two other deadlines of 2013 and 2015 
                                                             
1 The term NIC is used for developing countries that have surpassed most other developing countries 
in economic growth but have not yet achieved the status of a developed country. 
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were set which were also not met (REF). A reliable news daily reported that Indian 
companies have started to implement the IFRS converged Indian accounting standards 
(Ind AS) from June 2016 onwards (Seth, 2016). However, the latest update on IFRS 
website2, regarding the convergence process in India as of July 2017, indicates that India 
has not officially adopted IFRS.  
 
The discrepancy between rhetorical policy and practice in India was to some extent 
explained by local resistance to immediate convergence mostly manifested in the form 
of industrial lobbying due to legislative and taxation issues. However, the role of 
transnational influences in the process remains to be fully explored. Research has shown 
how donor agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) coercively seek to 
bring about standardisation, especially in developing countries. Literature suggests that 
substantial financial dependence on foreign aid from IFIs such as the World Bank (WB) 
implies that the state was no longer the sole orchestrator of reform policies (Adhikari & 
Mellemvik, 2010). Financial dependence on IFIs meant that accountability, in terms of 
efficient use of resources, played an important role in donor-recipient relationships, to 
the extent that most developing countries were not left with much choice (Adhikari & 
Mellemvik, 2010; Mantzari, Sigalas & Hines, 2017; Irvine, 2008; Neu, Ocampo, Garica 
& Zepeda, 2002; Mir & Rahman, 2005).  
 
In addition to the role of IFI’s, extant literature also provides some insights into issues 
such as the role of mimetic influences on countries in order to appear legitimate and 
comparable to ‘world leaders’ (Touron, 2005, pp. 886), socio-political influences on the 
development and convergence of IFRS (Chua & Taylor, 2008) and the role of multiple 
socio-cultural and geo-political factors such as religion and colonial history (Rodrigues 
& Craig, 2007).Specifically, institutional perspectives such as decoupling have been 
used to analyse issues such as symbolic versus substantial adoption of international 
accounting standards  (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007) as well as normative and mimetic 
sources of influences on convergence decisions such as auditors and industry 
counterparts of companies (Touron, 2005). These studies challenge the economic 
rationales cited by supporters of IFRS convergence and highlight the significant role of 
multiple actors such as regulatory authorities and MNCs in shaping the drive for 
convergence. They provide a strong analytical premise through different forms of 
institutional frameworks which could be applied to analyse significant geo-political 
alliances between nation-states. This study contributes to extant literature by identifying 
transnational influences through regional and trade alliances and analysing the role 
played by such influences in counter-balancing influences from IFIs and other 
transnational forums promoting convergence. 
 
Extant literature on the role of transnational influences channelled through traditional 
cross-country relations mainly focuses on developed countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, UK, US and Europe (Nobes & Parker, 2010; Nobes, 2013; Hail, Luez & 
Wysocki, 2010; Zeff & Nobes, 2010). These studies while providing useful insights into 
the effect of such relations on accounting standards and practices, do not fully explore 
the decision-making process through which the influence of such cross-country trade 
and economic relations are translated into financial reporting decisions, especially in 
developing countries (Humphrey & Samsonova-Taddei, 2015). They do, however, 
discuss a wide variety of sources of influence on financial reporting practices such as 
                                                             
2 http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/india/ 
4 
 
inter-dependence between countries through political and economic relations, the role 
of state and mutual influences on legal systems (Nobes & Parker, 2010). However, these 
influences would differ in the way they manifest themselves in the context of IFRS 
convergence in developing countries (Samsonova, 2009; Ding, Jeanjean & Stolowy, 
2007). Insights into the manifestations of these issues as carriers of cross-country trade 
and economic relations in developing countries as part of a wider transnational policy 
network would provide deeper insights into IASB’s ongoing convergence movement. 
 
Extant literature on convergence rarely answers questions such as ‘how do the 
geopolitical trade and economic alliances between countries shape the national decision 
for IFRS convergence? One exception to this is a study conducted by Ramanna & 
Sletten, (2014) who found that trade and economic ties do play an important role in 
convergence decisions. The authors note, 
Consistent with the presence of network effects in IFRS adoption, we find 
that a country is more likely to adopt IFRS if its trade partners or countries 
within in its geographical region are IFRS adopters (pp. 2). 
 
The authors further highlight the need for studies that analyse the significance of trade 
and economic alliances on convergence decisions as a necessary to comprehend the 
varying outcomes of IASB’s convergence drive. 
Analysis of the influence of such alliances on the decision-making process in this study 
is informed by an institutional analytical perspective focusing on the role of institutional 
fields that occupy and operate in the regulatory decision-making arena (Crawford et al., 
2014; Arnold, 2005). Institutional fields have been considered appropriate platforms of 
analysis to explore the struggles and negotiations that occur between actors in a 
regulatory decision-making arena (Arnold, 2005). Djelic & Sahlin (2009) further 
emphasise the role of institutional forces in shaping power relations between actors 
involved in decision-making in accounting regulatory arenas. In this context, few 
studies call for ‘sophisticated conceptions of power’ (Crawford et al., 2014, pp.305) and  
highlight the need to refrain from analysing power relations between institutional fields 
through a pluralistic perspective based on success achieved by actors in influencing the 
decision (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Crawford et al., 2014). Furnari (2016) while 
discussing institutional changes makes the following observation, 
The vast majority of institutional studies have analyzed instances of 
institutional change within a single institutional field, devoting less systematic 
attention to the issue of how institutional change occurs between multiple 
institutional fields (pp.553). 
This paper draws on extant literature to analyse the influence of trade and economic ties 
channelled through multiple institutional fields between nation states on power 
dynamics in the accounting regulatory arena. It uses concepts of resource dependency 
and exchanges to analyse these power dynamics in the accounting regulatory arena. 
The study contributes to the literature on global governance by highlighting the 
importance of not losing sight of the nation state as an important player in the 
transnational governance arena. Specifically, literature on global (accounting) 
regulation devotes a great deal of attention to the roles of organisations and agencies 
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with transnational remit (such as global standard setters, donor agencies) while often 
downplaying the significant impacts of the more traditional cross-country links forged 
through economic relationships and resource dependencies. This was specially noted in 
the case of the indirect influences of the US’s decision to delay IFRS convergence. 
While being interpreted as an indirect source of influence, such a decision played a very 
significant role on the convergence negotiations in India. The study shows how the US 
influence was channelled through Japan with which India has significant trade and 
economic relations and, most importantly, holds a joint forum specifically to discuss 
convergence issues. The consequences of India’s links with countries such as US and 
Japan in the decision-making process provide a vivid indication of the important roles 
of cross-governmental relationships in the global governance arena, and also question 
the position of transnational organisations as pervasive powers in such governance. The 
study’s findings clearly demonstrate that the pursuit of full IFRS convergence strongly 
favoured by the transnational forces was invariably challenged in the Indian context by 
the influences of powerful nation states advocating a more cautious approach. 
 
2. Notion of IFRS Convergence in India – Background 
In 1991 the government of India introduced several economic reforms in response to 
severe balance of payments crisis. Free market principles were adopted to attract 
international trade and create an open economy. This led to considerable dilution of 
state control over the economy leading to an increase in FDIs (Foreign Direct 
Investments). Over subsequent years the Indian economy witnessed a stable growth in 
the FDIs which led to investor demands for financial statements prepared according to 
IFRS. These investors were supported in their demands by some Indian companies that 
were either entering into joint ventures with foreign companies or purchasing them. In 
2007, the state and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) in response 
to these demands, made an announcement of IFRS convergence by 2011 (Jain, 2011). 
 
The ICAI initially supported full adoption but due to industrial lobbying decided 
along with the state to alter its stance to convergence with differences (CG2). A 
member from industry and professional bodies who was a participant in decision-
making groups stated, 
 
“The professional bodies in India were very interested in complete adoption of 
IFRS…. initially they virtually copied everything from IFRS. However, the 
industrial sector was seriously hit by IFRIC 15 that had a very different 
accounting treatment for real estate companies…. IFRIC 12 also affected many 
projects such as road transport projects, airport projects etc. through implications 
on direct and indirect taxes…so they objected...” (CG2). 
 
In its concept paper, the ICAI attempts to justify the differences between national 
accounting standards and IFRS by providing the following definition of convergence: 
 
“to design and maintain national accounting standards in a way that 
financial statements prepared in accordance with national accounting 
standards draw unreserved statement of compliance with IFRSs” 
(p.12). 
 
Despite significant carve-outs in newly framed IndAS, the ICAI has been quite vocal 
in its claims of substantial convergence with the IFRS. Through its concept paper the 
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ICAI identifies and discusses the key issues that shaped the decision to ‘not adopt’ 
international accounting standards. These issues include maintaining consistence 
with legal and regulatory requirements, economic factors related to the use of fair 
value, inadequate level of preparedness of industry and conceptual differences such 
as requirement to create provisions at an early stage under IAS 373. 
 
The decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India has been particularly 
intriguing due to controversial debates surrounding the issue as well as repeated failures 
to meet targets of roadmaps and deadlines etched out by the state and the ICAI. The 
enthusiasm for IFRS convergence displayed by the state and the ICAI at global forums 
was not translated into actual progress. The country was not able to meet the first 
deadline of 2011. The date set for convergence passed without any explanations or 
public notifications of delay. In 2012, an emphatic reiteration of the state’s intent to 
converge with IFRS by 2013 was conveyed through a statement made by the Minister 
for Corporate Affairs & Power at a seminar, 
 
“……we are determined to ensure that IFRS is implemented by April 1, 
2013,” (Srivats, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, this second deadline was also evaded without any public announcements 
or explanations. Following the second deadline, the ICAI prepared a new roadmap for 
convergence in 2013 which proposed the implementation of Ind AS by listed and 
unlisted companies worth more than US$ 78515755 (approx.) starting from 1st April 
2016. The roadmap proposed a deadline of 1st April 2018 for insurance, banking and 
non-banking finance companies (MCA 2015). 
 
Debating the decision is not unusual amongst countries moving towards convergence. 
However, it is unusual for a country to repeatedly announce convergence deadlines 
followed by long periods of delays shrouded in mysterious silence from the state. It was 
found that industrial lobbying was a key local factor that led to the delays. Tax issues 
that could be addressed only through legislative amendments by the state formed the 
central theme of industry resistance.  
 
Nonetheless, a deeper analysis of the Indian context suggests that transnational 
influences may have also existed in the form of regional and global trade alliances. 
Exploring the role of such alliances in causing repeated delays would contribute to a 
greater understanding of the nuances that shape national convergence decisions and the 
effect this has on associated countries and global standard setters. 
  
                                                             
3 The recognition of provision has been pointed as a difference using the examples of AS 29 and IAS 37 Constructive 
Obligation. The requirements of IAS 37 stipulate the creation of provision on the basis of constructive obligation 
which would result in the recognition of provision at an early stage. The concept paper cites an example of 
restructuring of an enterprise where an early recognition of a provision would not be appropriate since a liability 
cannot be stated to be crystallised at such an early stage. The discussion of such conceptual differences in the paper 
reflects differences in the opinion of the ICAI with regard to the timing of recognising the provision and also the 
judgement of related determining factors. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This paper follows the theoretical strategy of broadly defining transnational policy 
networks and resource dependency in an attempt to capture as much of the institutional 
role of these networks and resource relations, as possible. 
2.1 Transnational Policy Networks: Institutional Fields of Regulatory Decision-
Making 
Institutional dynamics of transnational regulatory networks and collaborations have 
been researched through multiple perspectives (Djelic & Sahlin-Anderrson, 2006; 
Djelic & Quack, 2010; Philips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). Transnational policy 
networks that drive regulatory decision-making processes are comprised of a variety of 
actors, both individual and institutional. However, a transnational network is not a 
formal construction, that is, the actors do not come together formally for the purpose of 
forming a network. These actors converge around a common issue regarding which a 
decision is being made (Hood, Baldwin & Rothstein, 2001; Suddaby, Cooper & 
Greenwood, 2007) while at the same time often having divergent views and opinions. 
So converging around particular policy issues provides such actors with opportunities 
to influence how such issues become eventually resolved. Hence, the motivation that 
drives these actors to interact with each other is to collectively exert influence on the 
decision. To influence a decision, actors often join forces and establish relations with 
other actors who favour similar policy opinions (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; 
Samsonova, 2009; Djelic & Quack, 2010; Risse-Kappen, 1995). However, it would be 
misleading to think of transnational networks as homogenous environments. Difference 
of opinion between network participants is common.  
Affiliations to multiple institutional fields could be one of the reasons for such variances 
in opinions and interests of actors in transnational policy networks (Philips et.al. 2000; 
Risse-Kappen; 1995). An institutional field is defined as a social arena of actors 
belonging to a common institutionalised environment characterised by the 
dissemination, production and reproduction of institutional rules and resources 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Philips et.al. 2000). Actors converging around a policy 
decision in a transnational network predominantly draw upon ideas and priorities 
institutionalised in their domestic institutional fields (Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Philips 
et.al. 2000). Institutional fields of powerful countries in a transnational policy network 
appear to be more influential in terms of determining the outcome of discussions that 
take place in such networks (Hardy &Philips, 1998).  The ongoing negotiations in 
decision-making often influences the institutional fields of less powerful nation-states 
in the network. Thus the decision-making process within transnational policy networks 
are influenced by national institutional fields and vice-versa. 
 
In the context of accounting regulatory decisions made by nation-states, some dominant 
institutional fields exist in the forms of domestic structures constituted of the state, 
society and polity (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Risse-Kappen (1995) while analysing the 
impact of transnational networks on foreign policies of the state, emphasised the 
significant role played by domestic structures. Differences in the domestic structure, 
that is, organisational interlinkages between the state, the society and the polity, have 
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been stated to create variations in the impact of transnational actors (Meyer, 1990; 
Rochon, 1988). 
 
Institutional fields prevalent in a country could determine the accessibility of the 
national political system to transnational actors such as IFIs and the requirements for 
effective coalitions between actors to enable the successful exertion of influence on 
national decisions (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Katzenstein, 1976). This implies that the 
ability of transnational actors to access the national political system of a country could 
depend on the position of the state vis-a-vis other non-state actors in the country. An 
example of the significance of domestic institutional fields could be the differences in 
the decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India and Bangladesh (Ramanna, 
2012). The contrasting policy impact of transnational actors in the two countries is 
reflected through the quick and non-controversial decision made by Bangladesh to go 
ahead with convergence under pressure from the WB (Mir & Rahman, 2005) while 
India had been going through controversial delays and debates in the decision-making 
process despite pressure from transnational actors (Srivats, 2012). This however, does 
not imply that India is absolutely independent of IFI’s. India’s resource dependencies 
on IFI’s are balanced by similar if not equally consequential resource dependencies on 
local non-state actors as well as other transnational regional actors whose stance on the 
convergence decision was different from that of the IFIs. 
 
2.2 Resource dependencies between institutional fields: Channels of power 
 
Decision-making shaped through power disparities arising out of resource dependencies 
between actors embedded in different institutional fields has been widely discussed in 
theoretical literature (Guo & Acar, 2005; Burt, 1983; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978; 
Friedkin, 1986; Nolke, 2003; Risse, 2005; Djelic & Quack, 2010). Casciaro & Piskorski 
(2005) explored resource dependencies by incorporating the theoretical constructs of 
power imbalance and mutual dependence to the existing resource dependency theory in 
the context of inter-organisational dependence and relations. These ideas when 
combined with different levels of institutional influences on decision-making processes 
help examine transnational networks in the context of accounting regulation. Louma & 
Goodstein (1999) examine institutional influences on decision-making processes at 
three levels or fields: a) society including legislative influences b) industry level c) 
organisational level. In the context of this study, this framework is adapted and 
integrated with resource dependency ideas to explore domestic and transnational 
institutional fields that characterise the society, polity and trading and economic 
networks. This helps visualise the transnational policy network for convergence 
decision-making process as a network constituted of several institutional fields that are 
interrelated to each other through resource dependencies and exchanges. Differences in 
resource capacities of these institutional fields lead to power disparities (Philips et.al. 
2000). 
 
While extant literature on transnational regulatory regimes do focus on unequal power 
dynamics of actors in transnational policy networks (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; 
Mir &Rahman, 2005; Ramanna, 2012), such power inequities in the accounting 
regulatory context have not been widely researched through resource dependency 
perspectives (Casciori & Piskorski, 2005). Philips et.al (2000) notes that power 
dynamics define the significant role played by rule and resources of different 
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institutional fields of actors in shaping decision-making processes on policies. Powerful 
actors belonging to resource rich institutional fields involved in transnational decision-
making processes are able to favourably influence other participants in the network 
(Hardy &Philips, 1998). This paper focuses on exploring the role of resource 
dependencies or exchanges between institutional fields as channels of power in 
transnational regulatory network. 
 
Power imbalance between two actors is determined by the extent of mutual dependence 
between their respective institutional fields (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Guo & Acar, 
2005; Philips et.al. 2005). This implies that the power equation between these actors or 
institutions would alter if there is a change in the mutual dependence over the course of 
time. It has often been observed that long-term alliances or relationships between 
national and global actors do change with changes in resource capacities of the socio-
economic and political institutional fields of nation-states. For example, the donor-
recipient relationship between India and the WB over the last two decades has witnessed 
a significant change with India graduating fully from World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) assistance programme4 (IDA, 2016). This change in 
the extent of resource dependence could determine the extent of influence that the WB 
could exert on national decisions. While the powerful IFI was able to exert direct and 
dominating influence on the national accounting decision of relatively more financially 
dependent country such as Bangladesh (Mir & Rahman, 2005), it may not be possible 
for WB to exert similar influence in India due to the changing socio-economic 
developments which have altered the power equation between the two actors. It is 
important to examine these features while studying the decision-making process for 
convergence as they help to explain the source of influences on the decision and also 
explain the reasons for power imbalance between actors in the transnational arena 
(Risse- Kappen, 1995; Nolke, 2003). 
 
Since transnational networks facilitate group decision-making processes across national 
and transnational institutional fields (Nolke, 2003; Risse, 2005), these networks are 
often characterised by power disparities. Two features of transnational policy networks 
that act as sources of power disparities in the decision-making arena are resource 
dependencies in relation to transnational agencies, and state/domestic institutional 
structures (Djelic & Quack, 2010; Nolke, 2003). The exchange of resources in 
transnational policy networks takes place through national and international institutions. 
These resources could be financial resources, information resources or technical aid for 
implementation of projects (Scholte, 2000; Keohane & Nye, 1989). Specifically, these 
features revolve around the donor-recipient relationship that exists between actors from 
different institutional fields in the decision-making arena. Resource dependencies 
between national and international institutions affect the on-going negotiations for 
terms of finalising the decision. This is because recipient actors are dependent on donor 
actors for resources and this places the latter in a relatively powerful position (Webb, 
1991; Cooper, 1968). Such a relationship acquires significance due to its power 
dimension and has a significant impact on the decision-making process (Garret & 
Lange, 1995; Haggard & Maxfield, 1996). And it is these institutions that determine the 
political influence on the process. Hence resource interdependencies across institutional 
                                                             
4 The IDA provides financial assistance to the world’s poorest countries. Countries graduating from IDA 
are those that have made significant developments in terms of per capita income, creditworthiness, 
economic and political progress and no longer receive substantial funds under this scheme (IDA, 
2016). 
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fields and distribution of political capacities among the actors also create power 
disparities that allows some actors to exert greater influence and significantly affect the 
decision-making process. Figure 1 presents a framework that combines the concepts of 
transnational policy networks constituted of actors from various institutional fields, 
resource dependencies and power disparities. 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Interconnected Institutional Fields of Transnational Regulatory Networks 
 
 
While the role of power in financial reporting decisions made by companies has been 
explored (Mantzari et al, 2017), power disparities as sources of institutional influences 
on actors making financial reporting decisions within countries have not been as 
extensively researched. Often actors who succeed in exerting a greater extent of 
influence are those who occupy powerful positions within the socio-economic and 
political institutional fields of the decision-making arena. (Krasner, 1995). Another 
important aspect is that the relatively less powerful actors do not concede easily to the 
influences of the more powerful actors; they respond to these influences and attempt to 
negotiate terms with other actors. It is interesting to contemplate on the reasons that lead 
certain communications to facilitate a desired change in policy in certain cases, but not 
in others. The different levels of social significance attached to different actors involved 
in the decision-making process could be cited as one of the reasons why all the actors 
do not enjoy the same level of power (Covaleski, Dirsmith & Rittenberg, 2003; 
Caramanis, 1996). In the standard-setting context of several countries, actors wielding 
greater power, such as corporate lobbyists, not only voice their opinions but are also 
successful in getting their views translated into action (Georgiou, 2004). Since 
accounting regulation in the national context has often been observed to undergo a 
group decision-making process and has also been stated to have political and social 
characteristics (Ding et al, 2007; Fearnley & Hines, 2003), it becomes necessary to 
study the power perspective to gain a clear understanding of the decision-making 
process of national standard-setting and the rationale that drives the same. Thus the 
accounting regulatory sphere within the national decision-making context involves 
significant power plays across multiple institutional fields at both the national and 
transnational level, which strongly influences the actual implementation process 
(Mantzari et al, 2017).  
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4. Research Methods 
 
Empirical evidence for this study was collected through interviews and analysis of 
archival data pertaining to a period of 8 years from 2005-2014. Significant information 
was gathered from discussions with 25 key actors involved in the decision-making 
process through interviews. Target groups and accessibility were the two main criteria 
that were used to finalise the list of interviewees. 
 
The process of data collection commenced with the mapping of key actors involved in 
the decision-making process. Identification of these actors was based on information 
gathered from personal contacts and secondary sources. Three members from industry 
who were also involved in public-private projects were personal contacts of the 
researcher. Being a part of public-private projects gave them access to senior 
government officials. At first, the researcher contacted these three members of industry 
via telephone and e-mails. Information provided by these contacts in addition to review 
of information available from online documentary sources such as reports of 
government organisations and professional bodies helped the researcher to further 
identify target groups. These target groups included members of professional bodies, 
international financial institutions and members of the core decision-making team for 
convergence led by the state.  Contact with target interviewees was established through 
introductions provided by the first three interviewees. 
 
In conducting semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepared an interview guide 
based on a list of themes identified from extensive literature review and theoretical 
concepts such as institutional fields, transnational and local actors, types of resources 
and policy networks. The interview guide included questions that were drawn from 
these themes and secondary data collected as part of background study for interviews; 
though some questions were reordered or skipped as deemed appropriate in the given 
interview context (Saunders, Thornhill & Lewis, 2012). Open-ended questions were 
drafted so as to encourage varying levels and ranges of responses from the interviewees 
(Gillham, 2005). These questions were designed to draw out the experiences and stories 
in the interviewee’s own words, at his/her own speed and order (McCracken, 1988). 
However, ‘planned prompts’ were used in cases where the interview appeared to get 
stalled on a single issue or when the information being provided by interviewees was 
beyond the scope of this study. These interviews facilitated the discovery of sufficient 
details of the interviewee’s story within a reasonable timeframe.  
 
Interviews conducted were mainly face-to-face but some interviews were conducted 
over telephone and Skype. Permission to record interviews was sought and all except 
senior government officials agreed to this request. Senior government officials cited 
regulations as the reason for not permitting to record the interviews. Data collected 
during discussions with these officials were manually transcribed soon after the 
interviews.  
 
A total of 6 interviews were conducted during the first round of interviews in July 2012. 
These included interviews with members of the ICAI and industrial associations. The 
second round of interviews in April 2013 included discussions with 10 actors directly 
or indirectly with the decision-making process. All except one of these interviews were 
conducted with members of the government including 4 representatives of the Ministry 
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of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and 5 representatives of the MoF. Several of these 
interviewees were re-contacted via telephone in May 2014 to corroborate information 
collected from documentary evidence as well as for new updates in the decision-making 
process. This also helped to bridge gaps that came up during analysis of data collected 
from the first and second rounds of interviews. The interviews used in this study as 
sources of information came from a cross-section of key actors of the decision-making 
arena occupying senior roles in the hierarchy of the organisations they represented. The 
length of interviews and codes assigned to interviewees are provided in the appendix. 
 
Documentary Analysis 
 
A wide variety of documents were used to collect information as also to substantiate 
data gathered from interviews. A classification of the types and numbers of documents 
used in this study are presented in Appendix 25.  
  
                                                             
5 Please see below 
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Table 2 Documentary Analysis 
 
 
A detailed comparative review of the various documentary sources discussed in Table 
1 to confirm the accuracy of timelines for construction of events. For example, details 
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regarding an event on convergence decision-making process published in newspapers 
were corroborated by collecting and reviewing documents obtained from the websites 
of actors/institutions mentioned in the newspaper. This information was further 
validated by interviewing concerned members of the said institution or organisation. 
Extensive documentary analysis had supplemented information gathered through 
interviews and in several cases documentary evidence was the main source of 
information in this study. 
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The data collected was analysed and interpreted to examine the influence of trade and 
economic alliances on India’s decision to converge with IFRS. The decision-making 
process was studied through an analysis of key events or milestones that occurred in 
India regarding IFRS convergence. The events were then streamlined on a timeline to 
enable a greater understanding of the sequence of events and the impact that these events 
had on the decision. Codes derived from the theoretical framework and review of 
literature were used to analyse and interpret these events. These codes were allotted to 
the four aspects listed in Table 26.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
6 Please see below 
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  Table 2 Data Analysis Structure 
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5. Findings 
 
5.1 Institutional Fields of Transnational Influences 
The decision-making process of IFRS convergence in India was triggered way back in 
2000 through indirect and ‘soft’ influences exerted on the state by actors from different 
transnational institutional fields such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) Sydney Resolution (UNCTAD X, 2000). In 2001, India volunteered to 
participate in the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) jointly conducted by 
the IMF and WB to assess the stability and resilience of financial systems in member 
countries. All these forums promoted IFRS convergence. 
 
Institutions such as the WB and IMF may be viewed as actors of developmental 
institutional fields at the transnational level. They interact with state and non-state actors 
embedded in political, economic and developmental institutional fields at the national 
level, working in public and private sectors as part of developmental projects. However, 
in the context of this study, the influence of such interactions extended into the 
accounting regulatory institutional fields and was not restricted to developmental 
institutional fields.  
 
In response to such influences, the Government of India (GOI) in 2001 established the 
National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS) constituted of 
members from regulatory authorities, professional bodies and industrial associations. 
NACAS was also used as a platform to engage with expert opinions of all stakeholders 
since the accounting standards were now being framed in alignment with IFRS (ICAI, 
2008). This is theoretically interpreted as change in the political/state institutional field 
at the national level in response to flow of influences from different trade and economic 
institutional fields at the transnational level. A government representative stated, 
 
“Government was now beginning to get serious….. we didn’t want to be left 
behind in the international scenario… we wanted our own experts to first validate 
these standards…and this was to some extent, the  result of the gradually changing 
global scenario…” (MCA 3). 
 
All these interactions with actors from transnational institutional fields may be 
interpreted as having a normative influence on the government’s decision to constitute 
the NACAS. It must be noted, however, that the influence of these institutions was not 
coercive. A World Bank representative stated, 
 
“ We are not in any way pressurising India to adopt IFRS….the process (for 
convergence) seems to have been initiated in an attempt to follow global 
trends” (WB1). 
 
This view of the WB was also corroborated by members of the MCA and ICAI. 
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Such interactions of the state operating from a domestic institutional field with global 
actors embedded in transnational institutional fields could be explained through 
normative and mimetic forces of institutionalism. The absence of coercive influences 
were expressly stated by interviewees. One representative of the MCA said, 
 
“….all these international institutions accepted Indian GAAP at the time …they 
encouraged us to use IFRS …but were not in a position to force us” (MCA2). 
 
To some extent, this was validated by documentary evidence on, for example, reduction 
in the financial resource reliance of India on institutions such as the WB and IMF 
(World Bank, 2017). The delays in the decision-making process also indicated that the 
state was in a position to resist   global pressures to converge. 
 
A trade and economic alliance that played a part in adding momentum to the decision-
making process was India’s trade relations with the EU. The EU is India’s largest 
trading partner7 as well as the largest source of its foreign direct investment (European 
Commission, 2017). The EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 followed by 
ESMA’s communications with the state, Indian regulatory authorities and the ICAI led 
to the setting of 2011 as the deadline of IFRS convergence for Indian companies listed 
on EU stock exchanges8. This deadline triggered India’s preparations for a formal 
announcement of convergence. The formal announcement for IFRS convergence by 
2011 was made by the ICAI in 2007, and officially notified by the state in 2008. These 
initial phases of the decision-making process witnessed the flow of both direct and 
indirect institutional influences from transnational institutional fields. For example, 
while EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS was an indirect source of influence, ESMA’s 
communications with the state and the ICAI were direct sources of influence. This could 
be interpreted as India being influenced by the convergence decision of a group of 
nation-states which is a significant trade partner and source of financial resources. The 
concurrence of the deadline set by the ESMA and the state adds impetus to this 
inference. This instance indicates that resource dependency relations between national 
and transnational institutional fields in the form of economic and trade alliances play a 
significant role in driving the decision-making process for convergence. The 
proceedings of the decision-making arena further demonstrate that the sources of such 
influences are not static and that they evolve with changing power dynamics not solely 
defined by financial resource dependency but also regional alliances between nation-
states.  
 
                                                             
7 Trade with EU constitutes 13.5% of India’s overall trade with the world in 2015-16 making EU its 
largest trading partner. This constitutes 2.2% of EU’s overall trade with the world and ranks India as its 
9th largest trading partner. EU exports to India increased from € 21.3 billion in 2005 to € 37.8 billion in 
2016 (EC, 2017). 
8 During the period of 2003-2012, Indian companies have invested $56 billion in Europe. During this 
time-period Indian companies financed 511 Greenfield projects and acquired interests in 411 companies. 
UK, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium are the four main countries attracting Indian corporate investors. 
UK attracts the major share                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
of investments with approx. 43% of Indian corporate investments ($ 24 billion) followed by Germany ($ 
6.9 billion). Major acquisitions include Tata Motors $ 2.3 billion purchase of Jaguar and Land Rover and 
Tata Steel’s $13.3 billion acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steel maker Corus (EICC Report, 2012). 
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In August 2009, the MCA set up a high powered group to discuss and resolve challenges 
faced in the IFRS convergence project. This ‘Core Group’ was constituted of members 
of different stakeholder groups and was headed by the then Secretary of MCA. 
 Some other significant transnational institutional fields that propelled the 
decision-making process were the US GAAP-IFRS convergence project led by 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and IASB, the SEC’ permission to file 
IFRS compliant statements and the G-20 summit held in Pittsburgh in September 2009 
as well as official convergence deadlines announced by countries such as Canada and 
China (ICAI, 2008; MCA, 2010). 
 
So while India was not under coercion from transnational organisations, through its 
membership in various transnational institutional fields, it was in effect under indirect 
pressure to make a commitment towards full IFRS convergence.  
 
5.2 Resource Dependencies between Transnational Institutional Fields: India-Japan 
IFRS dialogue as a channel of impact of US delays 
  
The year 2010 also saw the inflow of influences from regional institutional fields of 
countries such as Japan into the decision-making arena of IFRS convergence in India. 
In 2010, a Joint Working Group consisting of members of the Core Group from India 
and the IFRS council of Japan was constituted, in addition to forming subgroups for 
joint training programmes and also for jointly representing issues to IASB (MCA, 
2010). A member of the core group corroborated this information, 
 
“We (the government) are conducting joint sessions with the government of 
Japan….people from (professional) accounting bodies and some other 
regulatory authorities are also involved from both sides…” (CG5).  
 
Though both delegations were led by the state, actors from different institutional fields 
of both countries such as regulatory fields, industry and accounting profession were 
involved in the process. The Core group from India, led by the secretary of MCA was 
constituted of representatives from state bodies such as Ministry of Finance (MoF) and 
the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) office, regulatory authorities such as the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 
National Stock Exchange of India Ltd (NSE) and pension and insurance regulators and 
professional bodies such as ICAI (MCA, 2010). However, the IFRS Council of Japan, 
in addition to these representatives, included representatives from the Japan Business 
Federation (JBF). India appears to have excluded members from industrial associations 
such as FICCI and CII while Japan included them for this dialogue. Although, a member 
from the Core group emphasised that the views of the industry had been taken into 
consideration.  
 
“We had received several comment letters from industry regarding their views 
and issues about convergence …we had taken those issues into consideration 
during discussions” 
  
This relationship is likely to be significant because Japan is currently India’s 3rd largest 
source of foreign direct investment. Also India is the largest recipient of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan. Hence Japan has been providing financial 
assistance to India for infrastructure development projects such as the Delhi Metro Rail 
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Project (DMRC, 2014). Discussing the significance of India’s ties with Japan, a member 
of the MCA stated, 
 
“We have a longstanding and strong relationship with Japan…..not just on issues 
of convergence…more important spheres of trade, technology and economic 
relations” (MCA 3). 
 
In this case, the state and industry both included actors operating in trade and economic 
institutional fields in different capacities. For example, institutional state actors as well 
as private sector industry representatives such as the MCA were involved in maintaining 
decades of trading and donor-recipient relations with state actors of Japan through 
projects such as DMRC. These actors belonging to different institutional fields bring 
with them different priorities and ideas. Thus the India-Japan IFRS dialogue is a clear 
example of state driven networks between transnational institutional fields that 
influenced the decision-making process in India. 
 
However, the impact of this network was different from that of other transnational 
influences. Influences from all transnational institutional fields so far had most 
definitely been in favour of immediate IFRS convergence. Although there was no 
official evidence to prove this at the time, a senior member of the MCA revealed that 
the Japanese delegation was not very keen on immediate convergence,  
  
“… their opinions were slightly different from ours…they suggested 2017 for 
convergence which at the time we thought was quite late…. they were not in 
favour of immediate convergence” (MCA1).  
 
The reason suggested for this unofficial stance of Japan, by the MCA representative was 
the delay in US’s decision for IFRS convergence. Since US and Japan were significant 
trade partners, the latter was in no hurry to go ahead with convergence in a situation 
where the US had not yet made a final decision. 
 
This information provided by the interviewee was validated by some key events that 
marked the decision-making process for convergence in Japan. In 2009, a key standard-
setting body of Japan, the Business Accounting Council (BAC), issued a report that 
allowed voluntary adoption of IFRS by listed companies starting in March 2010. The 
report also stated that the decision for mandatory adoption would be finalised by the 
end of 2012 (BAC, 2009). In June 2011, however, the Minister of the FSA made an 
announcement of indefinitely postponing the decision on mandatory IFRS adoption 
citing reasons such as the SEC’s postponement of IFRS adoption in US, representations 
from Japanese industrial and trade union lobbies to postpone convergence, divergent 
factors in Japan’s economic and legal institutional fields and finally natural disasters 
such as Tsunami that had hit the country (Tsunogaya, 2016). 
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Tsunogaya (2016, pp. 831) notes the significance of the influence of US delays on BAC 
stating that, 
 
“The BAC’s policies have been largely influenced by the US-SEC decisions, 
which postponed the adoption of IFRS in the USA (see Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Uncertainty remains about whether or not the USA will ultimately 
mandate adoption of IFRS”.  
 
The author further states that the decision to postpone mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Japan was despite pressures on the BAC from the IFRS Foundation to speed up adoption 
as well as make financial contributions in order to maintain their position as a member 
of the monitoring board of IFRS Foundation. On the other hand, the study states that it 
is such pressure from the IFRS Foundations that “allowed” the BAC to announce 
voluntary adoption of IFRS in the country. This suggests that the BAC was trying to 
maintain a power balance between demands of actors from and global institutional fields 
while making decisions towards IFRS convergence.  
 
Such evidence from the Japanese decision-making arena demonstrates the wider 
applicability of the debates and discussions constituting the decision-making process in 
India. First of all, it suggests that influences from transnational institutional fields could 
also have been partly responsible for delaying or supporting those who wanted to delay 
the IFRS convergence process, not only in India but also in other countries going 
through similar decision-making processes. Secondly, the actions of the BAC, a key 
decision-maker in the Japanese convergence process when analysed through the lens of 
resource dependency dynamics used in this study, reflects the power balancing acts 
employed by the state as a key decision-maker for convergence in India. Thirdly it 
represents the flow of influences between decision-making arenas of different nation 
states. This point is elucidated through further discussion of the ideas that were 
transferred and exchanged between these arenas through resource dependency relations. 
 
A common and key feature that formed a part of the resource dependency dynamics in 
the decision-making processes for convergence in both India and Japan is the significant 
impact of US’s decision to delay convergence. The Indian decision-making arena had a 
small segment of actors who independently and informally followed the US decision-
making process and were convinced that the best strategy would be to wait till the US 
makes a decision on convergence. These opinions, however, were unofficial and 
informal. For example, an interviewee from the government stated,  
 
“If IFRS is so good, why isn’t the US adopting it? It’s been so many years …I 
am an accountant myself and my personal opinion is that US GAAP is much 
better and unambiguous in comparison to IFRS and that’s the reason why US 
has not adopted IFRS… let us wait to see what the US does ...although we are 
not officially obliged to follow the US” (MCA 2). 
 
The diffusion of influences across multiple transnational and national institutional fields 
to give shape to convergence decisions is clearly demonstrated through such evidence. 
Such actors included representatives of the state, professional bodies and industry. 
Some of the reasons and rationales presented by these actors and their influences on the 
decision-making process are discussed below. 
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Significance of US Delays on the Decision-Making Process in India  
 
 
Dependence on the US economy has been quoted by a few members of the Indian 
industry and the MCA as a reason for India’s reluctance to go ahead with the 
convergence process. According to one individual member of the industry,   
  
“…a significant percentage of Indian economy is dependent on US economy in 
terms of fund raising or customisation etc. maximum amount of private equity 
and FDI is received from the US economy via Mauritius or Cyprus route but the 
original source is the US economy” (IB 4).   
  
Further explaining the situation, the interviewee states that India would not like a 
situation where it had implemented IFRS and the US did not converge with IFRS.  
Noting that US GAAP is very investor friendly, the interviewee also stated that,  
  
“All big 50 companies in India are following US GAAP…they are preparing 
a second set of financial statements…” (IB 4).   
  
The views of the MCA representative on this issue are of a different nature. According 
to this interviewee, there are several others also within the government sphere who hold 
his point of view that US GAAP is far more advanced and unambiguous in comparison 
to IFRS.  
  
“Many people in the government also have the view that US GAAP is better...it 
is advanced and unambiguous unlike IFRS which is complicated and most 
people do not understand IFRS here…if IFRS is so advanced and efficient, 
then why is the US delaying convergence…” (MCA3).  
  
The evidence from the India-Japan IFRS dialogue and the opinions of government 
representatives quoted above suggest that delays in the IFRS convergence decision-
making process in the US have influenced the decision-making process in India in a 
dual manner. Firstly, through dependence of domestic institutional fields on trade and 
economic institutional fields in Japan and secondly through the alliance of institutional 
fields within the Indian and US economies. In both contexts, the US acts as a significant 
source of indirect and direct influence. Analysing the nature of the relationships 
between these institutional fields indicates that exchange of resources is an important 
aspect defining the relationship and hence acting as the cause of flow of influence. The 
relationships between the actors and their medium of influences will be discussed in 
detail in the last section of this paper. Hence these were some influences from the 
transnational institutional sphere that indirectly provided support to the rising local 
resistance to the convergence process in India. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study has found that India’s move towards convergence involved power-balancing 
flows of significant influences from actors embedded in multiple institutional fields in 
the decision-making arena rather than being solely influenced by IFI’s, as was observed 
in the convergence process of Bangladesh (Mir & Rahman, 2005). While the formal 
position of the Japanese delegation had been to engage in resolving convergence issues 
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the informal, and it would seem, its genuine position has been to delay convergence in 
response to US delays: 
 
During the formal meetings we had, the official policy of both sides focussed on 
immediate convergence …we realised during informal discussions at dinners and 
social events that they were not very keen on immediate convergence (MCA 1). 
 
Nevertheless, despite this preference for delay being well known to India, or possibly 
because of it, the official Indian view was that Indo-Japan dialogue was perceived as 
being an effort to speed up the convergence decision. The political institutional fields 
of Indian and Japan could also be viewed as having a resource exchange/dependency 
relationship because of the ODA recipient status of India with Japan. The India-Japan 
IFRS dialogue can be viewed as a forum of technical knowledge sharing. In addition to 
the donor-recipient relations between Japan and India, significant trade relations 
between Japan and US and the international operations of major Indian industries also 
acted as sources of influence; as also did the SEC’s decision to delay IFRS convergence. 
The outcome of these influences was that, as discussed earlier, all major Indian 
companies have been preparing financial reports according to US GAAP, in addition to 
the reports based on the previous Indian accounting standards.  
 
In this context, the influence of the US upon Japan cannot be overlooked, For example, 
the SEC’s delay in decision-making was identified as a key factor in Japan’s decision 
to delay adopting IFRS and, by extension, it also impacted India’s decision to delay 
convergence. This sequence of events can be interpreted as shown in Figure 2 as an 
instance where influence flows from the transnational to the regional and then to the 
local decision-making arena.  
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The arrows passing through the three regions indicate the flow of institutional influences 
from the US through Japan to the Indian decision-making arena for IFRS convergence. 
In addition, the flow of institutional influences between regulatory institutional fields in 
the US and India could also be interpreted as two-way. At a national conference of the 
American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) in 2010, while discussing the US approach to 
integrating IFRS with US GAAP, SEC’s Deputy Chief Accountant, Paul Beswick 
stated,  
  
To give you an example, India is set to move to IFRS in 2011. However, they 
describe their approach as a convergence approach to IFRS and have indicated that 
they may not fully adopt IFRS if they believe an exception is warranted… the 
majority of jurisdictions are either following a convergence or endorsement 
approach. If the US were to move to IFRS, I will call it a ‘condorsement’ approach. 
(Whitehouse, 2010) 
 
This statement demonstrates how the decision of the US on IFRS convergence was 
being informed by the experience of convergence projects in other countries, including 
India. Such examples of transnational references in the context of national decision-
making of different countries further emphasises the exchange of influences between 
global, regional and local institutional fields. 
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Since the state is the key official decision-maker in the convergence decision, a brief 
analysis of the nature of relationships between the state and few main actors in the 
decision-making arena is presented below:  
 
For example, Figure 3 shows the resource dependencies between transnational and local 
institutional fields of the network that drove the convergence decision-making process 
in India, focusing on the state as the official decision-maker.   
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While discussing the state’s resource exchange relations with industry, interviewees 
stated that corporates provide political support to the ruling party as well as other 
political parties. As a member from industry stated, 
 
Of course, there are links between government and industry…..our industry is 
powerful now unlike pre-liberalisation era when government could dictate 
everything…corporates provide large amounts of funds for election 
campaigns….and they certainly don’t do that for charity…  (IB4).  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the Indian government has resource exchange relationships with 
professional bodies, industrial lobbies and the Japanese delegation and it holds a 
resource dependency relationship with IFIs in the decision-making arena. In each case 
the resources are different. In the first case, the government provides legitimacy and 
authority to the ICAI and the ICAI provides technical support and knowledge regarding 
standard-setting. The ICAI, although autonomous to a great extent, still exists under the 
supervision of the central government. The standards issued by the ICAI become 
mandatory only when authorised and announced by the government. In 1999 the GOI 
constituted the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS), an 
advisory body on accounting standards under the Companies (Amendment) Act 1999 
(Das and Pramanik,2009). NACAS is also composed of members from professional 
bodies such as the ICAI. Between the government and IFIs, there exists a clear case of 
resource dependency – both financial and technical. The State Financial Accountability 
Assessment (SFAA) reports prepared by the WB and addressed to various provincial 
governments could be cited as an example of inflow of technical resource from IFIs.  
 
However, as illustrated in figure 2 the resource dependency relations of the state with 
other actors from both local and transnational regional institutional fields tone down or 
dilute the intensity of IFI’s influence over the decision-making process. The diminished 
influence of international financial institutions was noted by a representative of the 
MCA, 
 
Institutions like the World Bank and IMF had significant influence in the pre-
liberalisation phase in India. The growth of industry and the country’s increasing 
economic and political power in the Indian sub-continent resulted in a steady 
decrease of the influence of these institutions (MCA 3). 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the flow of institutional influence is determined by subtle 
power dynamics that are balanced on the resource dependence or exchange relations 
between actors in the decision-making arena. There is a power imbalance amongst 
actors in the arena that results in the flow of influence. The theoretical constructs of 
power imbalance and mutual dependence proposed by Casciaro & Piskorski (2005) lead 
to the inference that power imbalance in this context is determined by the mutual 
dependence of actors. Mutual dependence in the convergence decision translates into 
resource exchanges and resource dependence between global, regional and national 
actors.  
 
The type and nature of dependence or exchange of resources in an institutional field 
could place one actor in a relatively more powerful position than the other. For instance, 
the power balance between the state on one hand and on the other hand actors such as 
industries and Japan seems to be heavily tilted towards the latter due to substantial 
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resource dependence relationship with both Japan and industries. However, it should be 
noted that while Japan has been quite forthright in citing US delays as one of the factors 
influencing the Japanese convergence decision, the official stance of the Indian 
government has not been as forthcoming. For example, one representative of the MCA 
stated, 
 
We are not obliged to follow Japan or US…as the government of India we make 
independent decisions....we are not influenced by industry either…we take their 
views into consideration but they cannot influence us (MCA3). 
 
Despite such insistence, the power equation between the political and economic 
institutional fields within the country, for example, could be inferred from newspaper 
articles on heavy funding of political campaigns by powerful corporate houses. This 
was also demonstrated by the change in the stance of the state over time. While the state 
was initially keen to go ahead with convergence ideas initiated by international financial 
institutions and other global forums, the entry of industry and Japanese delegation into 
the decision-making arena seemed to have altered the stance of the state. Influences 
from the trade and economic institutional fields of the US that managed to permeate 
into the decision-making processes through indirect mediums partly contributed to the 
repeated delays in the convergence process. Interviewees from industry and 
professional accounting bodies did acknowledge that India is indeed influenced by 
decisions of significant and economically powerful trading partners. One member of 
industry stated, 
 
The government would always claim to be entirely independent of any influences 
…however, it is impossible to believe such a thing in this era…no country makes 
decisions in isolation…for example, why doesn’t Indian government hold 
convergence talks with Bhutan? Why Japan...Japan is more important to us in 
terms of trade etc (IB5)  
 
Analysing these relationships in terms of resource dependencies/ exchanges between 
national and transnational institutional fields provides a better explanation for the power 
dynamics observed in the global policy networks that constitute the decision-making 
arena. The resource exchanges and dependencies presented in Figure 2 could be 
interpreted as the sources that provide an influential position to certain actors and place 
others in a position to be influenced.  
 
In conclusion, the literature on global accounting convergence rarely examines the 
decision-making process for accounting standards convergence as being influenced by 
traditional cross-country economic relationships. This study contributes to the literature 
by emphasising the importance of nation states in the transnational accounting 
regulation arena by portraying the decision making process as being significantly 
influenced by the convergence decisions made by other nation states which are 
traditional economic and trade partners. Different types of resource dependency 
relations between the actors embedded in multiple institutional fields of   the 
transnational policy network driving the decision-making process play a key role in 
shaping the decision-making process. An example of such key influences on the 
decision -making in India was the impact of US delays on the decision to converge with 
IFRS. This demonstrates that while powerful transnational organisations actively 
promote convergence, nation states play a key role in counter-balancing the effects of 
such promotion. This is achieved by exchange of influences through traditional trade 
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and economic ties between nation states as well as successfully countering pressure 
from transnational bodies promoting full convergence. India’s ties with other nation 
states such as US and Japan on the convergence decision-making process highlights the 
significant roles of cross-governmental relationships within the global accounting 
regulation arena and also questions the portrayal of transnational organisations as 
unchallenged powers in such regulatory spaces. 
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW DETAILS 
 
 
 
Interviewee 
Code 
Position Type of 
interview 
Location Date Length of 
Interviews 
1. CG 1 Member of 
Core Group* 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 25 
minutes 
2.CG 2 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour  
3.CG 3 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 10 
minutes 
4.CG4 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
May 
2014 
1 hour 
5.CG5 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
6.MCA1 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
50 minutes 
7.MCA2 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
8.MCA3 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour  
9.MOF1 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
55 minutes 
10.MOF2 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
50 minutes 
11.MOF3 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
45 minutes 
12.PB1 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
13.PB2 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 20 
minutes 
14.PB3 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face 
& Skype 
Tamil 
Nadu 
July 
2012 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
15.PB4 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
 2   hours 
16.PB5 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face 
Skype 
New 
Delhi 
July 
2012, 
May 
2014, 
3 hours 30 
minutes 
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May 
2015 
17.PB6 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
 1 hour 
18.PB7 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone Kerala, 
India 
May 
2012 
2 hours 
19.PB8 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 
20.IB 1 Member of 
Industrial 
Association 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
2 hours  
21.IB2 Member of 
Industrial 
Association 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
2 hours 
22.IB 3 Member of 
Industrial 
Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
23.IB 4 Member of 
Industrial 
Group  
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
24.IB 5 Member of 
Industrial 
Group 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
July 
2012, 
May 
2013 
2 hours 30 
minutes 
25. WB1  Member of 
World Bank 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
January 
2013 
1 hour 
 
* Core Group (CG) – group constituted of key national decision-makers 
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APPENDIX 2 – CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS ANALYSED 
 
 
 
 
 
Documents Issued by 
 
Examples of Documents 
 
Government 
 
Reports, Press Releases, Press Notes, General Notifications 
 
Professional Bodies 
 
Reports, President’s Annual Message, Commentary 
letters, Exposure drafts, website material 
Public practice 
accountancy firms 
 
Reports by KPMG, PWC, Deloitte 
 
Regulatory Bodies 
 
Reports by SEBI, ESMA, website materials 
 
Professional and 
Business Media 
outlets 
 
The Business Standard 
The Hindu 
The Business Line 
The Economic Times 
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